Mathias von Buxhoeveden disputerar 22 Maj
Mathias von Buxhoeveden disputerar med sin avhandling Partial and General Equilibrium Effects of Unemployment Insurance. Identification, Estimation and Inference 22 Maj 09:15 i Hörsal 2, Ekonomikum, Kyrkogårdsgatan 10 A.
Opponent är professor Rafael Lalive från Faculty of Business and Economics på University of Lausanne.
Betygsnämndens ledamöter är professor Eva Mörk från nationalekonomiska institutionen, Uppsala universitet, professor Joakim Palme från statsvetenskapliga institutionen, Uppsala universitet och docent Björn Tyrefors Hinnerich frän IFN och nationalekonomiska institutionen vid Stockholm universitet.
Avhandlingen består av tre artiklar (abstracts på engelska):
Essay I: Wage setting models typically posit a tight relationship between the generosity of unemployment insurance (UI) and equilibrium wages. This paper estimates the effect of UI on workers’ wages. I build on a unique feature of the unemployment policy in Sweden, where workers can opt to buy supplement UI coverage above a minimum mandated level. In January 2007, the government sharply increased the price of UI, and the share of workers with supplement coverage fell from 90% to 80%. I exploit variation in the price of UI across industries to measure the effect of industry level UI-coverage on wages. My estimates suggest that a 10 percentage point reduction in the share of workers covered by supplement UI reduce wages by 5%. Since I rely on variation in UI-coverage at the industry level, these estimates contain wage adjustments from collective and individual level bargaining. Finally, I use the estimated UIwage effect to derive bounds on worker bargaining power in a simple DMP model and find that it can be at most 0.12. This evidence supports wage setting mechanisms that tie wages to the generosity of UI.
Essay II: This paper estimates the effects of unemployment insurance (UI) benefits on job finding rates and entry level wages for unemployed high school leavers. Up to year 2007, Swedish high school-students who became unemployed shortly after graduation were entitled to UI-benefits once they became 20 years of age. Therefore, the start of an unemployment spell relative to the 20:th birthday creates potentially exogenous variation in time to treatment. I exploit this to estimate the effect of UI benefits on unemployment duration and entry level wages. The results show that there is a large and statistically significant negative effect of UI benefits on the employment hazard. There are no detectable effects on entry level wages. This would suggest that unemployment benefits induce high school leavers to postpone labor market entry but does not seem to effect job match quality.
Essay III: Difference-in-Differences (DID) is a quasi-experimental method to evaluate the effect of a treatment. In the basic version, two groups are observed at two dates. The treatment group becomes treated in the second period. The effect of the intervention is estimated by comparing the change in the outcome experienced by the treatment group to the corresponding change in the control group. However, assessing the impact of an intervention is often complicated by the well-known problem of sample selection. In randomized experiments, one popular method to address this is to implement Lee (2009) bounds. This paper extends Lee (2009) bounds to the DID design. Identification results, estimators and a simple bootstrap procedure for computing standard errors are presented.
Hela avhandlingen finns att ladda ned i DiVA Open Access